If the Doctrine Loosely Fits, Wear It:
Constitutional Adjudication in
State Alienage Cases

FRANCIS J. CONTE*

The United States Supreme Court has permitted state legislative classifications based on alienage ratherfreely through the
use of the special public interest exception and the public/politicalfunction doctrine. This article critically assesses the Court's
methods of adjudication and its interpretationof principles,examines the consequences for aliens and our system, and concludes that an appropriate standard of review requires an
important governmental objective served by a closely drawn legislative classification.

INTRODUCTION

The integrity of our federal democratic system and all it entails
depends, in the last analysis, upon the United States Constitution
and its meaning. Judicial review of constitutional cases requires

the Supreme Court to function as actor, interpreter of the constitutional script, and director of all constitutionally required roles,
including its own. Constitutional, and therefore the system's, integrity must be measured in large part by assessing how faithfully this ultimate actor/director directs and performs its own
role.
This assessment of the Supreme Court's performance is particularly significant where the constitutional provision subject to the
Court's review is open-textured, that is, not self-operating, ex* Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; B.A., Pennsylvania
State University, 1964; J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 1969.
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pressly prohibitive, reasonably clear or clearly bounded. In assessing the Court's performance in interpreting these opentextured provisions of the Constitution, two general questions
should be asked: (1) is the method of adjudication faithful to the
Constitution? and (2) does the interpretation placed upon the
provision, in the circumstances of the case, comport with stare decisis in a constitutional sense?
The extent to which states can discriminate between classes of
persons is the focus of the particularly open-textured equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, a provision of pervasive importance to our governmental system and societal
structure. Further, one significant area of state discrimination
which is cause for considerable concern today is legislative discrimination based upon alienage. Therefore, Supreme Court
equal protection analysis in alienage cases is significant both in
terms of the consequences to aliens and in terms of the consequences to our federal democratic system.
This discussion will critically assess the Court's methods of adjudication, its interpretation of principles, and the consequences
for aliens and our system as a result of its state alienage discrimination decisions. More particularly, this evaluation leads to recommendations which are directed toward an equal protection
clause analysis infused with both vitality and integrity.
HistoricalPerspective
States have often legislatively deprived aliens of the capacity to
participate in activities open to citizens.' Over the years, the
1. See Walter, The Alien's Right to Work and the Political Community's Right
to Govern, 25 WAYNE L REV. 1181, 1181-92 (1979); Comment, Alien's Right to Work:
State and FederalDiscrimination,45 FoReHAM L. REV. 835 (1977).
Following is a partial list of statutes discriminating against aliens. It is an update of the compilation appearing in the Comment, supra, at 837 n.17. Amu. REV.
STAT. Am. § 34-301 (1974) (public works employees); AiK. STAT. ANN. § 72-605
(Supp. 1979) (pharmacists); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1151 (1974) (oral hygienists);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 2-705 (West 1966) (podiatrists); id. § 2-1020 (architects); GA.
CODE ANN. § 84-1503 (1979) (billiard room operators); id. § 84-2003 (peddlers); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 318.040 (Bobbs-MerriUl 1977) (plumbers); id. § 320.250 (optometrists); id. § 329.030 ("detection of deception" examiners); id. § 330.070 (auctioneers); id. § 334.050 (hearing aid dealers and fitters); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:970
(West 1974) (practical nurses); id. § 37:1272 (West Supp. 1981) (medicine practitioners); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-406 (1976) (executive officers, managers and majority shareholders of corporations); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-14-8 (Supp. 1980)
(veterinarians' qualification) (repealed effective July 1, 1986); id. § 61-27-14 (Supp.
1979) (private investigators); N.Y. Exxc. LAw § 215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981)
(state troopers); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59 § 1305 (West 1971) (bail bondsmen); id.
§ 1307 (bail bond runners); Op. REV. STAT. § 703.090 (1979) (polygraph examiners);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 642 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (poultry technicians); id. tit. 63,
§ 906(b) (Purdon 1968) (landscape architects); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.18.050
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United States Supreme Court has permitted legislative limitations based upon alienage rather freely, using the special public
interest exception until 1971,2 and the public or political function
doctrine since 1978.3 Between 1971 and 1978, however, the
Supreme Court strictly scrutinized such legislation: unless the
state statutory classification served a compelling state interest it
would be invalidated under the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause.4
(1978) (cosmetologists). A much more extensive though not necessarily up-todate compilation of discriminatory statutes can be found in D. CARLIER, THE
RIGHTS OF ALMNS

205-55 (1977).

2. Special public interests which served as justifications for withholding the
application of the equal protection clause on behalf of aliens by the Supreme
Court have included public works employment in constructing the New York subways, Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); the ownership of pool and billiard
rooms, Ohio v. Deckeback, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); and the leasing or ownership of a
small family farm, Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). The "special public
interest" doctrine, which pre-dated modem equal protection analysis, was described as an exception to the general rule that resident aliens could not be denied the right to engage in useful occupations, and presumably other activities.
However, the exception permitted the states to discriminate against aliens whenever public benefits or public resources were involved. As the public domain expanded the exception became more generally applied than the rule, and the
special public interest label as justification for discrimination was rather freely
used. The exception afforded states implicit approval for some rather absurd discrimination in the public interest including cosmetologists, hygienists, poultry
technicians, opticians, and embalmers. See supra note 1 and statutes cited
therein.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), significantly eroded the "special public interest" doctrine. See infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text; see also
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644-45 (1973) (the Court confirmed that the Graham case virtually eviscerated the "special public interest" doctrine).
3. Like its historical antecedent (the special public interest doctrine), the
public or political function doctrine in alienage cases was formed as an exception
to general equal protection principles. See infra notes 35-43 and 61-63 and accompanying text. The general principle that alienage discriminations are suspect and
precipitate exacting scrutiny under the equal protection clause can be disregarded
whenever the classification is deemed to serve "public or political functions." The
phrase is deemed an exception, but as the public/political/governmental domain
widens, the generally applied exception risks swallowing the rule. See, e.g., infra
notes 44-53 and accompanying text. The Court has not clearly differentiated between public and political functions. It has used both terms, as well as "governmental function," to justify providing considerable discretion to states to
discriminate on the basis of alienage. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978)
("political responsibilities" and "public responsibilities"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979) ("governmental" functions); and Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct.
735 (1982) (political function).
4. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).

The doctrinal struggle present in the alienage cases is an unfortunate example of the Court's failure to provide consistently principled bases of constitutional adjudication. In so failing, the
Court has seriously eroded the most significant protection available to minorities, the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause; its meaning, its reliability, and therefore its value is
shaken. The Court itself has often noted that these cases "have
not formed an unwavering line over the years."5 That the cases
have not formed an unwavering line alone raises no serious problem; little today does not waver. That no appropriate method of
adjudication is used to arrive at principles in support of the
Court's decisions, that no enduring or evolving principle justifies
the wavering, that the wavering is justified by ignoring and rewriting earlier precedential decisions, and that recent decisions which
promote the wavering line gracelessly abuse logic are, however,
cause for grave concern.
The concern then, is not solely for aliens and other groups who
may be vulnerable to majoritarian mistreatment, but also for the
integrity of constitutional roles and provisions and for the principled articulation of constitutional values. 6 These constitutional
pronouncements furnish no reliable pattern from which consistent and closely connected principles can evolve, and require
those seeking answers to elemental questions to hazard a guess
based upon the political, social or economic disposition of the

Court.7

Further, if on the one hand the Court can in the name of sub5. Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. at 72.

6. Of course, there must also be concern for the reappearance of obnoxious
state parochialism toward aliens and minorities. These decisions may be viewed
as supportive of such parochialism, to the extent that it exists. See, e.g., Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. at 744-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Though an impor-

tant concern, it is secondary to the fundamental constitutional concerns of this
discussion.
7. This concern has been raised in other contexts by eminent commentators.
See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 44-48 (1980); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959). See generally Symposium on ConstitutionalAdjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
259, 582 (1981). But see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-33 (1962).
One excellent example of the general problem can be observed in the right-toprivacy cases culminating in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The problem there
concerns the Court's own imposition of rights not reasonably inferable from the
text of the Constitution. Even assuming the propriety of a right to privacy in the
abortion context, the Court's capacity for constitutional rights enactment might
only be exceeded by its necessarily concomitant capacity to repeal constitutional
rights. The alienage cases are indeed an example. The integrity of the Constitution and our structure as a constitutional society is thereby weakened. Individuals
cannot rely on fundamental values whose durability wholly depends upon the values of a majority of the Supreme Court. Indeed, values so dependent are not
fundamental
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stantive due process weave its own values into constitutional
fabric8 and, on the other hand, shake the integrity and reliability
of a representation-reinforcing protection such as the equal protection clause 9 by carving out potentially unlimited exceptions
based upon a majority's view of public need, then under what circumstances can the Court not dilute constitutional language and
thereby crumble these and other constitutional cornerstones?
The Present Problem and a New Direction
Even if the Court had consistently applied any one of the principles or sets of principles that it has up to now called upon in
these casesO the constitutional integrity of its decision-making in
this area would be flawed. The use of either the special public interest doctrine or the more recent public/political function exception saps the vitality of a main principle for constitutional
adjudication. Suspect classes, compelling interests and precise
fits mean little next to such expanding exceptions.
8. A much discredited but still chilling example is Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905). The most recent weaving has taken place in the right to privacy
area. See supra note 7.
9. See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 73-104, 116-19, 135-36.
10. These principles include the special public interest exception utilized prior
to Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), the pure suspect class
rationale of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the political function/suspect class hybrid of the Foley, Ambach, and Cabell cases, see supra note 3; or the
traditional rational basis test. Perhaps the substantial goal/rational basis test hybrid of Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982), can be added, though that principle
arrives as a result of a different set of antecedents. Aliens generally were not the
subject of discriminatory state legislation in Plyler. Further, the discriminatory
deprivation of an education injured the children of the illegal aliens. The loss of
an education, an important if not fundamental interest, and the harm to the children, made Plyler a unique case. The Court stated that more was involved than
the question whether the law discriminated against a suspect class, or whether education was a fundamental right. The Court emphasized that the law depriving
the children of illegal aliens of an education
imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable
for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the
rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny
them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and
foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the
smallest way to the progress of our nation.
Id. at 2398.
Interestingly, the Court in Plyler went on to apply a hybrid rational basis test,
which is similar to the important objective balancing test that is advocated in this
article. See infra notes 94-95, 111-12, and accompanying text The test advocated
here would yield the same result, however, through reasoning which is consistent
with principled constitutional adjudication.

The rational basis test which is used with increasing frequency
is generally debilitating in that under it almost any insubstantial
justification forecloses protective application of the clause. On
the other hand, the enlargement of the "suspect class" status to
include aliens, and presumably eventually other like categories,
which accounted for the hiatus of virtually absolute protection of
lawful resident aliens between 1971 and 1978, is unwarranted. It is
unwarranted because the kind of unrestrained elasticity of definition which led to the determination that alienage was a suspect
class, as with substantive due process, encourages judges to enshrine their collective or individual value judgments beyond constitutionally connected meaning. Though rational basis and
public function exception tests drain the clause of its vitality, infirm definitions of suspect status distend its constitutional function and reduce its reliability and integrity. Definitional firmness
connected to the core purpose of the clause, as well as an analysis
which imbues the clause with vitality, is needed.
Both stare decisis in a constitutional sense and principles of
constitutional adjudication are best served by consistently applying a firm definition, which would not include aliens, to the term
"suspect class." However, by requiring that legislation discriminating against socially and politically isolated groups, such as
aliens, be invalidated unless it is closely drawn to serve an important state objective, the general vitality of the clause can at the
same time be enhanced, compatible with stare decisis and principled constitutional adjudication.
THE LOOSE AND INCONSISTENT BASES OF THE COURT'S
ALIENAGE DECISIONS

Constitutional principles derive their strength and vitality from
two primary sources, constitutional language and well-reasoned
and judicially articulated connections to constitutional language.
The quality of the constitutional '"principles" created by the alienage cases must be measured in terms of the second source. The
bases for the public/political function doctrine as recently articulated by the Court are-far from well-reasoned connections to
constitutional language-loose and inconsistent at best.
The present public/political function doctrine, which results in
most state discrimination being tested under the rational basis
test, must be viewed in light of the shadows cast by the Court's
opinions adjudicating the rights of aliens challenging state discriminatory legislation over the past dozen years."
11. Although the Court's decisions concerning congressionalpower to discrim-
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Prior to 1971, the Court's view was typified in Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Commission,12 where the Court determined that the
special public interest doctrine was no bar to an alien earning a
living as a commercial fisherman off the coast of California. The
Court was "unable to find that the 'special public interest' upon
which California relies [ownership of the fish within its territorial
waters] . . .provides support for [a] state ban on [alien] fishing."13 The position taken was doctrinally consistent with earlier
decisions. Beginning with Graham v. Richardson in 1971,14 however, the Court has been doctrinally inconsistent. In Graham,the
Court was faced with challenges to Arizona and Pennsylvania
laws by alien applicants for public assistance benefits. The alien
residents had been denied welfare benefits by their respective
states because of a fifteen-year alien residency requirement in Arizona and a citizenship requirement in Pennsylvania. 5 The Court
declined to follow the traditional special public interest exception
analysis, which had been used whenever state legislation was
challenged by aliens on constitutional grounds.16 Instead, the
Court suggested that the earlier case, Takahashi, had "cast doubt
on the continuing validity of the special public interest doctrine in
17
all contexts."'
In Takahashi, however, Justice Black applied the special public
interest doctrine and simply could not find that California had
any special public interest in denying commercial fishing rights to
aliens.18 The majority opinion cast no doubt whatsoever on the
general validity of the special public interest doctrine; it explicitly
considered the doctrine and found it inapplicable to the case at
hand.19 The Graham Court, however, invented a "cast doubt" to
justify springing from that doctrine to a modern equal protection
inate in alien-related cases warrant considerable thoughtful scrutiny, this discussion is limited to the constitutional validity of state restrictions on aliens.
12. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
13. Id. at 420.
14. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
15. Id. at 367.
16. Id. at 374.
17. Id. The special public interest doctrine, in effect, had permitted state dis-

criminatory legislation if governmental concerns amounted to a "special public interest." See supra note 2.
18. 334 U.S. at 420-21.
19. Id. Indeed Justice Rehnquist emphatically recognized this in his dissent in
Sugarman. See 413 U.S. at 454-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

analysis. 20 And, having wiped the slate clean for present purposes, the Court proceeded to articulate compassionate, fairly logical, but altogether new standards. Stare decisis, even in a
flexible constitutional sense, had taken a backseat. 21 Nonetheless
the Graham Court did part company with the exception and embarked on a new journey guided by recently evolving equal pro22
tection dogma.
As a result of long accepted and seldom questioned wisdom,
our courts generally protect persons from discrimination by state
acts under the aegis of the equal protection clause unless the
23
state act is rationally related to some legitimate state objective.
Where, however, the persons affected by the discriminatory state
classification are members of a "suspect class" or are losing fundamental constitutional rights, courts as a rule "strictly scrutinize" the state legislation, which will not withstand such scrutiny
unless the state can show compelling reasons for the classification.24 The use of the rational basis test usually means the courts
will uphold the discriminatory legislation; 25 the application of
strict scrutiny usually supports invalidation, though these outcomes need not be as automatic as they generally are. In fact, a
conscientious application of either branch of this analysis would
result in a more vital principle and more constitutionally appro26
priate results.
20. See 403 U.S. at 374-76.
21. See infra note 96.
22. To be fair, the Graham Court offered further justification. It stated that
the doctrine was grounded upon the notion that whatever is a privilege rather
than a right may be made dependent upon citizenship. It distinguished between
the privilege of "commercial fishing opportunities" at issue in Takahashi and the
right to welfare benefits, as if the ability to earn a living and support a family by
fishing were any less important than the ability to support a family through public
assistance eligibility. 403 U.S. at 374-75.
23. Id. at 371; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
24. This discussion is not concerned with the "fundamental rights" branch of
equal protection analysis, though it too has constitutional and logical deficiencies
in an "equal protection" context. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 66062 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. For example, the Warren Court only invalidated one statute under the rational basis test. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Since 1971, the Burger
Court has invalidated more; however, those cases involved wholly unwarranted
gender-based discrimination. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
26. A more conscientious application of the rational basis test should seriously
review the reasonableness of the legislative choice by assessing the choice's intended impact in comparison to the significant disadvantages promoted by the
choice. The acceptance of any out-of-context rational basis by the Court without
serious consideration of the disadvantages accompanying it is virtually a refusal to
review. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. Further, if under the strict scrutiny/compelling state interest type of analysis the Court precisely and graphically
draws upon factors elucidating the importance of state interests in comparison to
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The Graham Court did not apply the rational basis test, but
found that "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of discrete
and insular minority... for whom, like racial minorities,. .. our
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate" and so characterized aliens as a "suspect class" and applied the "strict scrutiny"
test.27 The Court did not reveal precisely why aliens are a prime
example of a discrete and insular minority.28 Indeed, just what is
a discrete and insular minority for equal protection analysis purposes constitutes a much more important question than the virtual ipse dixit treatment which accompanied this determination in
Graham. Not only did stare decisis take a backseat but no
thoughtfully conceived method of constitutional adjudication was
evident at all.
In Sugarman v. Dougall,29 Justice Blackmun, for the majority,
again rejected the application of the special public interest doctrine, this time in the context of an equal protection challenge to
New York's exclusion of aliens from competitive civil service positions. 30 Because this legislation was overinclusive 3 ' and underinthe seriousness of the disadvantages promoted by the legislative choice, then a
compelling state interest might not be an unleapable state interest but merely a
compelling one.
27. 403 U.S. at 372.
28. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The
application of the Carolene Products footnote's exhortation for heightened scrutiny of legislation affecting "discrete and insular" minorities is arguably appropriate here since aliens, perhaps more than any group, are otherwise politically
helpless when faced with majoritarian excesses. The characterization of aliens as
a suspect class, the argument might go, suitably fits the prophylactic purposes of
the equal protection clause. See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 160-70, 194 n.51.
However, an argument can be and is made that aliens are not a suspect class
because alienage is not an immutable characteristic and that, except for one period in United States history, aliens have not been a class traditionally subject to
widespread hostility and prejudice. See infra text accompanying notes 102-10. In
fact, we are a nation of recent alien ancestry. Suspect classes should arguably be
reserved for those minorities whose identifying characteristics are immutable and
who have been generally and historically subject to widespread hostility and
prejudice based upon unjustifiable stereotypes. Resident aliens can in many cases
become citizens, and aliens as a class have not generally and historically been
subject to hostility and prejudice, as have certain groups of aliens as nationalities,
such as Jews, Asians, southern Europeans, and Mexicans. But in these cases perhaps it is their cultural, ethnic, and national identities rather than their alienage
which incites the hostility and prejudice.
29. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
30. Id. at 644-45. More than rejecting the doctrine in this particular instance,
Justice Blackmun imaginatively created a compartment to confine the special public interest doctrine to legislation affecting the exploitation of natural resources.
This type of legislation apparently would include limitations on land ownership,

clusive, 32 it did not withstand the new test of Graham.33 After
Sugarman, which then seemed a mere extension of Graham, and
ignoring the leap made and the method used in Graham, all
seemed constitutionally well and good, consistent at least with
fair and generous treatment of aliens, 34 until 1978.
In Foley v. Connelie35 the relatively new foundation for equal
protection analysis in alien cases cracked. The Court was faced
with a challenge to another New York statute, this one requiring
that state police officers be citizens. 3 6 The Court did not, however, subject the statute to the heightened judicial scrutiny which
Graham and Sugarman seemed to require. Had the Court used
"strict scrutiny" it could perhaps still have upheld the statute by
demonstrating that the state had a compelling interest in having
important police responsibilities carried out by citizens. 37 To do
inheritance of land, and natural resources exploitation. What he seemed to create,
however, was in effect not a compartment but a coffin for the doctrine. Its reincarnation, however, would not be long in coming.
31. The legislation included aliens in menial and clerical positions with no important policy-making or sovereign functions. Id. at 647.
32. The legislation failed to include aliens in non-competitive government positions or public officers appointed by the governor or legislature. Id. at 640.
33. But dictum which would later haunt most of the Sugarman majority apologetically lurked in the shadows of the decision. Justice Blackmun stated that the
Court's "scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting
firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives... [and] constitutional responsibility for the establishment and operation of its own government, as well as the
qualifications of an appropriately designated class of public office holders." Id. at
648.
34. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (striking down Connecticut's
citizenship requirement for lawyers); Examining Bd.of Eng'rs v. Flores, 426 U.S.
572 (1976), (Puerto Rico could not prohibit aliens from practice as licensed civil
engineers). In 1977, though, the foundation built on Graham began to quake
slightly. In a 5-4 decision in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court invalidated New York's bar to providing state financial aid to education for aliens.
There were, however, four dissenters. Justice Rehnquist argued that alienage
classifications need not be "suspect" where the state limitation provides aliens an
opportunity to raise themselves from their otherwise powerless state by becoming
a citizen or declaring their intention to do so. Id. at 20-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Accepting the authority of the Carolene Products footnote, the quality of
powerlessness of a class of persons seems at least arguably determinative of their
status as a "discrete and insular minority" deserving the protection of heightened
judicial scrutiny rather than as a mere class of persons left to fend the tides of
discrimination with only the rational basis test.
35. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
36. N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 215(3) (McKinney 1972) provided that: "No person shall
be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the
United States." 435 U.S. at 292.
37. No argument for this position is being advanced here; however, the Court
could have searched more conscientiously than it did for factors evidencing a substantial connection between citizenship and the responsibilities and discretion invested in police officers. See supra note 26. Chief Justice Burger's discussion
emphasized the importance of police officer functions, but provided no connection
between those functions and the need for citizens to perform them. He simply
concluded that "it would be as anomalous to conclude that citizens may be sub-
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so would have been consistent and principled, at least from the
standpoint of stare decisis in a constitutional sense.
Nor did the Court reject the principle that aliens are a "suspect
class." 38 This would have been harsh but honest.39 Instead Chief
Justice Burger relied upon the dictum from Sugarman that "our
scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters
firmly within a state's constitutional prerogatives," 40 and merely
applied a rational basis test to the classification. The Sugarman
Court had justified this view as "no more than a recognition of a
State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its
democratic political institutions ... , and a recognition of a
State's constitutional responsibility for the establishment and op-

eration of its own government.

...
41

But the use of this dictum,

in Sugarman, and more importantly in Foley and later cases, is
logically unsound and worse, misleading.
Elevating the Sugarman dictum to such distinction transforms
the Sugarman decision itself into an empty contradiction. In
Sugarman, the Court did apply strict scrutiny where public functions were involved. If as a result of the dictum the case permits
a general public function exception to strict scrutiny in alienage
cases, then the dictum decimates the significance of the very
holding which it accompanies. 42 The Sugarman Court's primary
position is described in the following passage:
We recognize a State's interest in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are
jected to the broad discretionary powers of non-citizen police officers as it would
be to say that judicial officers and jurors with power to judge citizens can be
aliens." 435 U.S. at 299. Perhaps it is; perhaps it is not. Beyond his conclusion
though, the fourteenth amendment and decisions interpreting it say little about
anomalies as principled bases of constitutional adjudication.
38. But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649-64 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
39. Graham's foundation, as described earlier, is vulnerable, and the mutability of alienage and lack of widespread hostility towards aliens arguably distinguishes the class from race, nationality, and other classes deemed "suspect." See
infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
40. 435 U.S. at 296 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 648).
41. 413 U.S. at 648 (citation omitted).
42. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 303-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting), pointed out that the Court's reading of the Sugarman dictum
out of context with the unambiguous holding makes the dictum an exception that
swallows the rule. See also Nyqust v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. at 11 (the Court that
decided Sugarman emphasized "the narrowness of the exception" by asserting
that states could not reserve for their citizens every "vital public and political
role") (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 729).

within "the basic conception of a political community." We recognize, too,
the State's broad power to define its political community. But in seeking
to achieve this substantialpurpose, with discrimination against aliens, the
means the State43 employs must be precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose.

The Court acknowledged important public or political purposes
and still employed strict scrutiny. Beyond that important contradiction, how can a class be sufficiently "discrete and insular" and
therefore "suspect" when the state discriminates in economic or
social terms and no longer "discrete and insular" or "suspect"
when it discriminates in '"public function" or "political" terms?
Suspectness in no other area depends upon the function of the
discriminatory legislation. The class does not mutate as the function of the legislation changes. Perhaps in some cases the state's
interest may become compelling. But the nature of the
threatened group remains constant as the purposes of the legislation change. The Court should focus upon the quality and the significance of the state's interest in achieving its asserted goal. In
demonstrating a compelling interest, the state's evidentiary burdens may admittedly be substantial, but the hurdles of strict scrutiny need not be insurmountable.
Further, how reliable to a burdened minority is a principle of
protection if it diminishes whenever the very legislative majority,
against whom the principle was designed to protect the minority,
chooses to label or characterize the discrimination in a way which
relieves that majority of the principle's vigilance? To be useful
against majoritarian excesses, a principle protecting minorities
cannot shift at the whim of a majority; if it can shift, then it will
shift once the majority recognizes how to characterize its discrimination. A principle so infirm cannot function as a principle.
The Court continued its assault on logic and principled decision-making in Ambach v. Norwick," where Justice Powell took
up the cudgel to protect New York public school students from
alien teachers. A New York statute 45 prohibited non-citizens who
did not intend to become citizens from teaching in public schools.
This law was challenged by a Scot and a Finn who were married
to American citizens and who were otherwise certifiable as public
school teachers. 46 Justice Powell, for the majority, recited a litany
of support "for governmental functions, which is an exception to
the general [suspect class] standard applicable to classifications
43. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 642-43 (citation omitted)
added).
44. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
45. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3001(3) (1981).

46. 441 U.S. at 71.

(emphasis

[VOL. 20: 265, 1983]

State Alienage Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

based on alienage .... "47 To arrive at the exception to the standard, he characterized public education as a governmental function. Ironically, he quoted Brown v. Board of Education48 in
support of the view that "[t] oday, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments" '49 In answer
to this position, it is clear that though education is important and
is in part administered by state governments, in its teaching and
learning roles it does not function as government or as any part of
government. Indeed, except for the expense and general availability of education, the relationship between government and education is unnecessary. In any case, five justices felt that public
education should be labeled "a governmental function," applied
the rational basis test and sustained the discriminatory legislation,50 confirming Justice Marshall's fear that the exception would
swallow the rule.5 1 The governmental function label was now
pasted on education, and a substantial if not engulfing public
function exception was engrafted on the suspect class standard

for aliens.
Ambach was fairly consistent with Foley,52 but it demonstrated
47. Id. at 75.
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. 441 U.S. at 76 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
The importance of education from the standpoint of a government's obligation to
provide it has been seriously questioned in San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Commentators have also questioned any reliance on Brown as a recognition of the fundamental nature of education in a constitutional context. See Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1959) and Order, Are Aliens Still a Suspect Class After Norwick? 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227 (1980).
50. Usually the application of the rational basis test is an invitation to sustain
the legislation in question. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Occasionally, however, legislation does not survive the rational basis test. Judge Johnson
in Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aDd, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982), struck
down the Texas law and school district policy which made public education virtually unavailable to the children of illegal aliens. Judge Johnson perceived no rational justification for the law and policy. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court
needed to amend the usual rational basis test in order to justify invalidating the
Texas law. The Court, because of the unique factors in the case-the innocence of
the children and the significance of education-required that the Texas law not be
considered rational "unless it furthers some substantial goal of the state." Plyler v.
Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2398 (1982). Judge Johnson's earlier perception that there was
no rational basis for the law may be difficult to support since unimportant, even
trivial, bases may be rational.
51. See supra note 42.
52. It may in fact be a more justifiable decision from one standpoint. The class
attacked by the New York legislation-those aliens who do not intend to become
citizens-involves members who though powerless and immutable given present

the ease with which the Court can label legislative enactments to
promote value choices shared by at least the Court's majority.
Though stare decisis was paid lip-service in Ambach, the infirm
m6de of adjudication represented by the governmental function
gap in equal protection analysis further withered the integrity of
the Court and the Constitution. 53 The road from Takahashi to
Ambach is fraught with logical potholes and perishable principles. At many turns the Court should have taken the road not
taken. One can only stare indignantly at the sight of it.
Still, the Court's retreat from Graham continued. In -Cabellv.
Chavez-Salido,54 the reliability of the Graham to Ambach standard was apparently further diminished.55 In Cabell, aliens challenged a California law which precluded all aliens from being
employed as deputy probation officers.5 6 The challenged legislation excluded aliens, in fact, from becoming "peace officers." Deputy probation officers were one of seventy categories of "peace
officers" to which the exclusion applied. The United States
Supreme Court validated the legislation, reaffirming that under
equal protection clause analysis, strict scrutiny of state alienage
classifications is not warranted where the state restriction primarily serves a political function. 57 The Court relied upon the dicta
in Sugarmanv. DougallB and the more recent Foley v. Connelie59
and Ambach v. Norwick6O decisions in support of this position.
The two-step analysis presumably applied was that legislation
properly characterized as serving a political function will be upintentions, in most cases could change, but have decided not to. Their acquiescence in their own minority-ness and powerlessness perhaps justifies lifting the
shield of suspectness.
53. It also begged a series of logical questions: if public school teachers, why
not lawyers or applicants for competitive civil service? Why not accountants,
pharmacists, and physicians?
54. 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982).
55. The principled basis for the decision is quite unclear. Although the
Ambach and Foley cases are mentioned in the opinion in several contexts, the
Court never actually spoke in terms of the rational basis test. The closest Justice
White came to identifying the actual standard that the Court applied was a conclusion that "strict scrutiny is out of place when the restriction primarily serves a
political function . . . ," 102 S. Ct. at 739, and that the "citizenship requirement
may seem an appropriate [legislative] limitation. . . ." Id. at 743.
56. The adjective "all" is used to differentiate the California law from other
legislation which discriminates only against those aliens who do not intend to become citizens. The mutability of the class in the latter case is a matter of choice
and the discrimination not as unavoidable as in Cabell. See supra note 52.
57. 102 S. Ct. at 743. The Court's earlier decisions, Foley and Ambach, had, as
noted earlier, supra note 3, carved out a "public/governmental function" exception
to the rule that strict scrutiny should be applied to test the propriety of state classifications based on alienage.
58. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
59. 435 U.S. 291 (1978); see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
60. 441 U.S. 68 (1979); see supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
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held if it serves any reasonable purpose, that is, any legitimate
state objective, 61 and if the classifications described in the legislation "substantially fit" the purpose to be served. 62 The Court
found that (1) deputy probation officers could be properly characterized as serving a political function; (2) exclusion of all aliens
from law enforcement positions in which discretionary decisionmaking occurs is a legitimate state objective (a reasonable basis
supporting the legislation);63 and (3) legislation excluding aliens
from seventy categories of "peace officers," all with law enforcement functions, however trivial or substantial, classifies in a way
which "substantially fits" the purpose of the legislation.
At the outset of Cabell the Court repeated its stock expression
that the Court's decisions involving state classifications dealing
with aliens over the years have "not formed an unwavering line,"
but it noted that a pattern, resembling the development of legal
principles generally, could be divined.64 In support of this proposition, the Court resurrected Justice Blackmun's unsupported
view of Takahashi as "[casting] doubt on the continuing validity
of the special-public-interest doctrine."65 The Court characterized
Graham as an element in a continuum, flowing from Takahashi,
and a logical extension of the erosion of the special public interest doctrine, rather than as a leap from one kind of analysis to an
entirely different one, wholly uncontemplated in Takahashi.
It was apparently important for the Cabell Court to view Graham as part of a continuum rather than as the start of something
new. If Graham were simply an extension of Takahashi, then
Graham, Takahashi, and their ilk66 could be labelled as "eco61. The Court never actually states this in its opinion, thereby leaving the
opinion without any fully stated principle upon which it can rest. See supra note
55. The Court cites dictum from the Sugarman case that in the public function
area "our scrutiny will not be so demanding." Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct.
at 739 (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 648). However, in view of its reliance upon Ambach and Foley, both of which ascribe to a "reasonable basis" test,
it may be safe to assume that the Court meant to use a reasonable basis test. On
the other hand, in view of the flexibility of the wavering characteristic of these
cases, it may not be safe to assume anything, especially where it is unstated.
62. 102 S. Ct. at 741.
63. The Court stated that the legislation "may seem an appropriate limitation." Id. at 743.
64. Id. at 738.
65. Id. at 739.
66. Some of the forerunners of Takahashi involved activities which might easily be characterized as "economic." See supra cases cited in note 2.

nomic activity" cases, 67 separating them from public/political
function cases and providing a two-branch doctrine, one branch of
which would in time wholly overshadow and sap the vitality of
the ofher. This loose labelling practice is theoretically similar to
the "cast doubt" approach the Graham Court virtually invented
in order to drain the vitality of the special public interest doctrine.68 Additionally, by characterizing Graham as merely eroding one public interest exception, the Court further provided itself
with a continuing pattern of justification for further erosion in
Cabell. From the majority's view, it is preferable that Graham be
a part of a continuum of evolving principles of which Cabell's exception is only an extension. If Graham, on the other hand, were
characterized as the origin of a principle it would be more difficult
to justify placing it on the "economic" side of a wavering line, because at its inception the Graham doctrine must be viewed in
more absolute terms than merely as one flank in a doctrine of
multiple applications.
But the Graham holding did not "flow from Takahashi," nor
was it part of any continuum of principle. Graham applied modern equal protection analysis to alienage classification cases
which had not been hinted at earlier. Graham, indeed, was a
starting point. And so, to justify its view that Graham and ultimately Cabell are merely subtle waves in the traditional evolution of legal principles, the Court in effect rewrote Graham, and
indeed, Takahashi. This demonstrates how very little regard the
Cabell Court had for stare decisis in a constitutional sense. This
is not surprising in view of the regard shown by the Court in Graham, Foley, and Ambach.
The consequences of the Court's gerrymandering of legal principles are not trivial. Superimposing an economic/political dichotomy pattern on state alienage classification cases necessarily
places the civil servants of Sugarman and the lawyers of In re
Griffiths69 on the opposite side of the line from peace officers and
public school teachers and yet on the same side as the fishermen
of Takahashi, which, to repeat an earlier sentiment, insistently
begs the question: why are lawyers and applicants for competitive civil service more like fishermen and welfare recipients than
public school teachers and probation officers? The Court would
67. The Court stated that Graham and other cases where the Court had applied heightened scrutiny involved "restrictions on lawfully resident aliens that

primarily affect economic interests." 102 S. Ct. at 739.
68. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
69. 413 U.S. 171 (1973). In In re Griffths, decided the same day as Sugarman,
the Court found that a Connecticut rule barring otherwise qualified aliens from
practicing law was unconstitutional.
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presumably answer that the latter sufficiently engage in the exercise of power to be considered participants in "political functions." 70 But surely lawyers and civil servants are as likely as
school teachers to exercise sovereign power, whatever that is.
What is most important about this doctrinal dichotomy is that
(1) the distinctions between economic and political functions
drawn by the Court are quite unclear and therefore subject to the
momentary whim of a majority of five of the Court or any lower
court judge or panel; and (2) the economic/political dichotomy is
improperly attributed to a line of cases which seemed to eradicate
the very doctrine from which public interest exceptions earlier
arose.
Another major problem with Cabell, as with the earlier Ambach
and Foley cases, is that the Court again misconstrued and misapplied the analysis provided by Sugarman. In Sugarman, the
Court first recognized "that classifications based upon alienage
are 'subject to close judicial scrutiny' and that the Court must
[t] herefore look to the substantiality of the State's interest in enforcing the statute in question, and to the narrowness of the limits within which the discrimination is confined."7' The Sugarman
Court then went on to closely scrutinize the New York statute
before it. That close scrutiny involved a process by which the
Court first considered the statute's underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness in relation to positions which the state has an interest in limiting to citizens. The analysis in Sugarman, as noted
earlier, involved the close scrutiny that the Court applied to classifications affecting "suspect classes." The Court in Cabell, however, characterized the Sugarman analysis not as an application
of heightened scrutiny but merely as an evaluation used to determine whether the particular restriction generally serves political
72
or economic goals in the first place.
Cabell's two-step evaluation process, on the other hand, first requires an examination of the specificity of the classification to see
whether it is substantially overinclusive or underinclusive. If it is
either, it would tend "to undercut the governmental claim that the
70.
71.
dictum
72.

See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. at 743.
413 U.S. at 642. This is so in spite of tentacled growth of the unfortunate
in Sugarnan. See supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text.
102 S. Ct. at 739. Apparently, the need to serve merely legitimate political

ends is a reflection of the Court's unannounced use of a rational basis test.

classification serves legitimate political ends."7 3 But, to repeat,
the Sugarman Court in effect assumed a substantial state interest
and used its two-step analysis as close scrutiny to determine
whether or not the legislation actually served that particular substantial state purpose.7 4 A close look at the preciseness of the
statute's terms informs the Court of the legislation's breadth of
purpose, and in Sugarman the Court found that the statute was
not confined precisely enough to fit the state's substantial interest.7 5 The Sugarman Court said nothing about the statute serving
economic goals as opposed to political goals; its concern was
whether the statute precisely addressed important state interests.
Thus, the validity of the analysis employed in Cabell was attributed to Sugarman, but then used for an entirely different and
much more facile purpose. In Cabell the Court either misunderstood or misrepresented the core of the recent Sugarman holding.
In addition, the Cabell Court amended the "purported"
Sugarman analysis as it applied it. Though Justice White, for the
majority, agreed that the California statute was somewhat overinclusive, 76 he stated that "the classifications need not be precise;
there need only be a substantial fit."77 Sugarman meant nothing
like this. Sugarman assumed an important state interest when it
applied "strict scrutiny" and it required "narrowly confined" and
precisely drawn classifications,7 8 a far cry from classifications that
need only substantially fit. As a result, unfortunately, in terms of
doctrinal consistency, Sugarman and Cabell do not even loosely
fit, yet one is relied upon to support the result in the other.
As a result of all this, where does the law stand? Presumably,
73. 102 S. Ct. at 740; see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
74. The Sugarman Court stated: "We recognize, too, the State's broad power
to define its political community. But in seeking to achieve this substantialpurpose with discrimination against aliens, the means the State employs must be precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose." 413 U.S. at 643 (emphasis
added).
75. Id.
76. The statute at one time required citizenship for cemetery sextons, inspectors, toll service employees, and park and recreation employees, among seventy
other "peace officer" positions. 102 S. Ct. at 741 n.9. Justice White acquiesced in
the view that the statute might be overinclusive as to these, but, in his view, the
district court had been wrong in striking down the statute on that basis and in assuming that if the statute was overinclusive at all it could not stand. Id. at 741.
77. Id.
78. 413 U.S. at 643. Although the Sugarman dictum continues to exist, it is
wholly unnecessary and contradictory to the analysis of Sugarman itself. To give
it any credibility, one would have to read Sugarman as saying strict scrutiny will
be applied to all state legislative classifications involving aliens, including cases
where important state interests are asserted except in cases where important
state interests are asserted. Since the holding does not rest on the dictum and the
dictum read with the holding constitutes nonsense, the only sensible interpretation of the case must ignore the dictum.
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(1) aliens remain a "suspect class" when challenging state legislative discrimination, but (2) if the goal of the legislative classification serves a political or public function the legislation will stand
unless (3) the classifications do not substantially fit the political
function goals. The law is simply stated but susceptible to whimsical application.
Beyond doctrinal and logical difficulties, how does this amalgam
of standards affect the capacity of aliens to protect themselves
from majority discrimination? When do classifications not substantially fit? In Cabell, about fifteen percent of the positions covered by the "peace officer" category were unrelated to the state's
sovereign interests. 7 9 Presumably, a fit where fifty percent of the
positions were unrelated to the legitimate state purpose would be
too loose, not a "substantial fit." That leaves a gap, a substantial
gap, within which the substantiality of the fit will presumably be
defined by lower courts in the future.
Further, the state's interest need only be "reasonable" or "legitimate," not compelling or even important. So a state discrimination which is based upon some state interest so long as it serves
some political or public function will stand unless lower court
judges find that the state's classification coverage exceeds by
some undetermined degree the "substantial fit" found in Cabell.
What this less-than-loose fit leaves us with is a state of constitutional law subject to capricious change at any moment depending
upon the sympathies of any majority of five. Stare decisis in a
constitutional sense may be flexible but the vacillation seen here
brings Supreme Court adjudication "into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket good for this day and train only," not flexible but unreliable. 80
Realistically, we cannot always expect the decision-makers in
our courts or even the United States Supreme Court to be wholly
79. See supra note 76.

80. The words are Justice Roberts', no stranger to important reversals, in
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). A recent related example of this almost ad hoc use of principles in constitutional adjudication
is Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982) where the Court, faced with the impropriety
of invalidating legislation discriminating against illegal alien children under a
"suspect class status" analysis and the weakness of a traditional rational basis
analysis, required that the legislation meet not merely reasonable but substantial
state goals. Though the result in Plyler may be socially and politically just, the

loose play with principles that achieves it further weakens the core standards and
meaning of the equal protection clause.

free from political, social and economic biases or personal and
collective value choices in decision-making, and we can expect
the results of decisions to reflect these biases and choices in a
general way. It is one thing to suggest ideal solutions from an academic perch and quite another to be immediately responsible for
the impact of those solutions in a society bubbling with emotional, social, economic and political reverberations. But some
modicum of doctrinal consistency, some fair representation of
earlier decisions, some logical integrity over more than a few
years, and some fidelity to the Constitution is not too much to ask
of our highest court. The failure of the Supreme Court Justices to
impose doctrinal consistency along with settled and durable principles derived from a sound method of adjudication is not only
unsatisfying but may lead to increasingly arbitrary and biased decision-making, and raises serious questions about the fundamental nature of the purported fundamental law.8 1
The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution
81. Courts may never wholly employ the wonderful models of interpretation
nor apply the consistent, objective standards the theoreticians deem essential.
This recognition does not mean that because models and standards are sometimes
ignored, there need not be models and standards. This recognition does not mean
that appellate decision-makers should be free to plant the constitutional garden
with their own value choices, or even the value choices that they divine are the
peoples'. The constitutional garden has been planted and can only be planted in a
particularly prudent way if its values are to take root and in time flower and bear
fruit. The judiciary has not been, nor should it be, involved in the planting. The
federal convention and the amendment process are the prudent sowers that serve
this role. Watering, weeding, spadework, and a little careful trimming is more the
judiciary's role.
The late professor Alexander Bickel suggested, in discussing first and fourteenth amendment questions, that "the answer requires normative choices and
prophetic judgments-much as does the solution of other problems of social policy." See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 35 (1970),
quoted in Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme
Court, 84 HARv.L. REv. 769, 784 (1971). Judge J. Skelly Wright asserts that Professor Bickel "regards constitutional provisions as clearly controlling only the most
painfully obvious and paradigmatic instances of unconstitutional action. His unwillingness to take more than the most crabbed, narrow view of constitutional language.. ." compels him to require value choices in filling in majestic
constitutional outlines. Wright, supra,at 784. Bickel insists that by balancing, predicting, and testing values, Supreme Court Justices make policy. A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEnous BRANCH 100-03 (1962). He states "[indeed], very often it engages in a Socratic dialogue with the other institutions and with society as a whole
concerning the necessity for this or that measure, for this or that compromise."
Bickel, Foreward:The Passive Virtues, 75 HAv. L.REv. 40, 50 (1961). This may be
the problem. Perhaps the Court views itself as Bickel thought it should. But it
cannot balance, predict, and test values with any degree of objectivity or validity.
The United States Supreme Court, composed of nine isolated, older, established
persons, of all groups, may be least able to do that. Even if it could, it would
clearly be subverting the Constitution, the amending process, and the respective
roles the Constitution provides for the people, the legislature, and the judiciary in
the process.
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contains one of those majestic phrases which tempts the cultivators of the Court. Among its sweeping fertile furrows the Court is
tempted to plant and uproot values as it predicts their eventual
acceptability. In 1971, in Graham, the Court in an expansive and
generous environment precipitously announced a new doctrine.
It granted aliens "suspect class" status, in effect immunizing
aliens from almost any state discriminatory legislation. Then
from 1978 to 1982, the value orientation of the Court and perhaps
society changed. With it the Court's view of the equal protection
clause's protection of aliens, among others, changed. Although
many with politically and socially generous viewpoints may well
agree that an expansive interpretation of the equal protection
clause served the ends of justice and morality in 1971, many
others, fed up with reflexive liberal values by 1978, believed they
had captured the value consensus. 82 But aren't both viewpoints
just that-merely viewpoints, transitory value choices? And as
difficult as it is to accept the doctrinally .inconsistent turnabout in
the later cases, wasn't the earlier precipitous determination that
aliens are a suspect class also unwarranted, and isn't it still?
More importantly, is the responsiveness of the Court to shifting
viewpoints any way to run a constitutional system?
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Equal protection clause analysis generally is a complex area in
constitutional adjudication. Even most interpretivists would
probably agree that proper interpretation of the clause requires
something more than the text itself.8 3 It cannot simply mean that
82. Plyler v. Doe may represent another momentary value shift. There, where
five sets of values would have been offended by traditional rational basis test analysis, the Court supplied the needed adjustment to arrive at the desired value result. The test used in effect equated "rational basis" with "substantial goal,"
though it is clear that rational basis means something less. Since the test used
there is not only an aberration, but also definitionally erroneous the result seems
to be supported solely by the Justices' collective value judgment.
83. Interpretivists are like positivists. They usually advocate judicial restraint
and constitutional decision-making which, in determining constitutional meaning,
rely upon the textual language of the Constitution, reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom and, in some cases, historical evidence. See J. ELY, .Supra note 7, at 1
(1980); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706
(1975). Non-interpretivism, on the other hand, permits the courts to provide for
constitutional rights where there is no plausible textual source within the Constitution or perhaps even inferrable from its structure. See Perry, Noninterpretive
Review in Human Rights Cases: A FunctionalJustification,56 N.Y.U. L.REV. 278,

no state can deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protec282-83 (1981). Natural law, moral philosophy, American tradition, and well-accepted values are among the perceived sources of these rights. Interpretivists and
non-interpretivists have been the prime participants in a sharp debate recently.
The debate, which strikes to the heart of our system of judicial review, has been
especially instigated by a series of articles by John Hart Ely culminating in a book
entitled Democracy and Distrust. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse
Racial Discrimination,41 U. Cii. L REV. 723 (1974); Ely, The Supreme Court 1977
Term-Foreword: On DiscoveringFundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978);
Ely, Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode of JudicialReview, 37 Mn. L. REv.
451 (1978); and Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism, Its Allure and Impossibility, 53
IND. LJ. 399 (1978). "Ely's musings on the subject have provoked a virtual efflorescence of thought and writing." Estreicher, Platonic Guardians of Democracy:
John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme Court in The Constitution'sOpen Texture, 56
N.Y. REv. 547, 548 nA (1981); see also ConstitutionalAdjudication and Democratic
Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981); Meeks, Foreword: JudicialReview Versus Democracy, 42 OHo ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional
Democracy, 1979 WAsH. U.L.Q. 695, 695-96, 701; Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-BasedConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness
on the Edge of Town: The Contributionsof JohnHart Ely to ConstitutionalTheory,
89 YALE LJ. 1037, 1037-57 (1980). Apparently, Professor Ely fully represents
neither school but espouses a quasi-interpretivism, perhaps best characterized as
a process-based mode of constitutional adjudication, the foundation for which is
found in footnote four of the Carolene Products case. That elemental explanation
of constitutional adjudication states:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of con[than reasonableness] . . . when legislation appears on
stitutionality ...
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced by the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into review of
statutes directed at particular religions or national or racial minorities,
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted).
Ely's process-based approach makes the inquiries suggested by the second and
third paragraphs of the footnote. He discovers that pure interpretivism is incomplete because, in part at least, it would not provide for minorities what our federal
democratic system intended to provide. He suggests that where democratic
processes have fallen short in their representation of minorities, the Constitution,
primarily through the equal protection and due process clauses, virtually compels
the conclusion that the textual language be augmented to assure appropriate protection. This includes the heightened scrutiny afforded "discrete and insular" minorities under the equal protection clause. See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 30-32. Ely
allows judges some free-lancing with the equal protection clause though he probably deems it limited at least to equality in cases of discrimination among classes
of persons.
According to Ely, it is appropriate that appellate judges constitutionalize participational and representation-reinforcing values, though not substantive values
(such as the right to privacy or liberty to contract). Ely perceives that the imposi-
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tion of the laws. At some level of justification, states must be able
to distinguish among classes of people to provide for the public
welfare in areas not preempted by Congress. The Supreme
Court, of course, usually requires in its equal protection analysis
that the governmental classification be '"rationally related" to a legitimate governmental objective. Because the "rational basis"
test requires a very low level of justification, 84 where a classification discriminates against a race, religion, national origin or a
"discrete and insular minority," the courts, aware of majoritarian
dominance in our system, have offered a higher level of scrutiny,
"strict scrutiny," by which they usually require that the legislation serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn toward that end. Presumably because racial classifications
originally gave rise to the fourteenth amendment and are so obnoxious, the legislative motivation leading to such enactments is
deemed "suspect" and the test used seems to provide an almost
unleapable hurdle.
A simple but important question for the constitutional adjudication debaters concerning the open-textured equal protection
clause is: other than for race, when is the characterization of a
group as a "suspect class" appropriate?
Non-interpretivists would apparently permit the suspect class
assignment whenever the Court determines that the assignment
protects a moral value supported by traditional social ideals, the
moral vision of the judge, natural law or general principles of
political morality. This generalized position constantly subjects
the Constitution to the ebb and flow, or punch and counterpunch,
of the values of majorities of five, or less in the case of lower
courts. Further, it impeaches the Constitution's integrity as funtion of process-oriented values does not flaw the integrity of the constitutional process of adjudication. Indeed, it is Ely's view that this approach has more integrity

and is more consistent with representative democracy because it does not permit
judges to enshrine values in the open-textured areas of the Constitution generally
but permits them to do so only when they are "conspicuously well situated to do
so." Id. at 102. Judges know enough about process and representative structure to
impose values whereas they are not "better reflectors of [more] conventional values than elected representatives." Id. More conventional interpretivists would
not go so far as Ely; non-interpretivists would go much further.
84. This low level of justification may be deemed appropriate by most, but it is
certainly not immune to criticism. Legislative discriminations are almost always
validated under this test. As is later suggested, an important state interest or at

least a significant reasonable basis is more warranted.

damental law.85

Purist interpretivists would go beyond the rational basis test
only for "race" and perhaps religion and national origin. 86 This
would leave the equal protection clause with a small role indeed.
If it is going to mean much at all, the equal protection clause must
offer more than the easy-to-overcome rational basis test and the
extremely limited "suspect class" category which most interpretivists would use.
Defining the "discrete and insular minorities" of the Carolene
Products footnote 87 as broader than race, religion, and national
origin, and providing more protection, gives the clause the vitality
it needs. At the same time judges should be prevented from imposing personal and collective value choices upon the Constitution. Thus a firm definition-if not clause-bound, at least one
fairly projective of the characteristics that the clause unarguably
is concerned with-is needed. This duality-vitality plus definitional firmness-also seems compatible with a system characterized by the balances of democratic representation, federalism,
separation of powers, due process and equality.88 This seems especially necessary if no more than a "rational basis" test will
otherwise be applied in the usual case.
But who are the "discrete and insular minorities" to be provided this added protection? According to the Carolene Products
footnote they are minorities against whom "prejudice . . . tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." 8 9 Ely asserts, understandably, that in equal protection cases the footnote suggests
that the Court should "concern itself with what majorities do to
minorities," for example, enacting laws directed against "religious, national and racial minorities and those infected by
prejudice against them." 90 Assuming that a constitutional clause
85. See supra note 81.

86. Id.; J. ELY, supra note 7 at 30-32; see also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
87. See supra note 83.
88. Definitional firmness connected to the core concerns of the clause provides
a check against the exposure to value imposition which an inexplicit standard
brings; whereas, the controlled elasticity which permits growth beyond historically-limited textual language provides the vitality which accompanies the most
democratic of our policy-making institutions. Within the process of the decisionmaker resides a duality similar to that featured throughout our system of checks
and balances: vitality and vigilance; fairness of process, yet order; equality, yet
democratic decision-making.
89. See supra note 83.
90. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 76. Most interpretivists, however, would give short
shrift to the "authority" of the footnote and not go beyond a limited reading of the
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may have some meaning beyond the precise circumstances
which may have motivated its proposal and ultimate ratification,
it is reasonable to infer that the clause compels the Court to apply serious scrutiny to classifications which are closely comparable to those which it unarguably addresses. But in the case of the
equal protection clause, should strict scrutiny be applied to classifications involving all minorities affected, however momentarily,
by prejudice and powerlessness?

Among other standards and mixes of standards which have
been offered, one that seems quite appropriate is that heightened
scrutiny should be applied whenever the condition that makes an
individual a member of a minority is immutable9 ' and where the
minority has been traditionally subject to widespread hostility
and prejudice on account of its condition, a hostility and prejudice
deeply rooted in stereotypes. In support of this view, the third
paragraph of the Carolene Products footnote suggests a more
searching judicial inquiry when prejudice against discrete and insular minorities is a special condition which tends seriously to

curtail the political process ordinarily relied upon. This language
asks the question: when is prejudice against a wholly separate
equal protection clause. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his Sugarman dissent, only four members of the CaroleneProducts majority joined in that opinion.
413 U.S. at 656 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He also referred to a further observation made by Justice Frankfurter that "[a] footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of announcing a new constitutional doctrine, and the Carolene footnote
did not purport to announce a new doctrine." Id. (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) (concurring opinion)). Further, Justice Rehnquist suggests that
neither language nor historical evidence "suggest to the slightest degree" that the
equal protection clause was intended to render any class, other than racial or national origin minorities, "suspect." 413 U.S. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But why
isn't a reading of the clause's meaning which would permit the invalidation of any
statutory classification just as reasonable as Justice Rehnquist's reading? Literally the clause provides that no state shall deprive any person equal protection of
the laws. A truly literal reading provides no justification for any state legislative
classification.
91. "Immutability" need not be limited to physical immutability; that is, color,
national origin, gender, et cetera, but characteristics otherwise immutable should
satisfy this portion of the suggested test. Cultural identity (Jews, Arabs) and sexual psychological identity (homosexuals, transsexuals), are examples.
Ely questions the general importance of immutability as a fast requirement. See
J. ELY, supra note 7, at 145-70; see also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 363 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting) (ability of mother to pursue remedy should not be precluded because she failed to legitimize her child according to statutory
procedure).

and isolated minority sufficiently virulent to infect the political
majority?
The mere characterization of a group as a group against whom
some generally recognized prejudice exists does not seem to be
enough. Prejudice or hostility which is widespread and rooted in
stereotypes that are unanswerable by reason is the kind which
could infect a political body. But unless the process is too infected to respond to reason, then reason rather than prejudice has
a fair chance to prevail. And that may be all we can ask for in a
democracy.
Further, though, what degrees of discreteness and insularity
provide us with a minority toward whom exacting scrutiny is required? Is an individual a member of such a minority if she can
change her minority-identifying characteristics or withdraw from
the group? Perhaps not. Is transient or less than immutable "minority-ness" sufficient to provoke exacting judicial scrutiny? If the
legislation is directed against her only insofar as she chooses to
remain within the class, she can alleviate the discriminatory impact by removing herself from the group. Then, the prejudice
against the minority no longer seriously infects nor curtails the
political process as to her. So, immutability seems to be a desirable quality to retain within the doctrinal definition of discrete and
insular minority.
For some, all this makes too much of the footnote. 92 But
paragraphs two and three of the footnote at least, though not
binding in any precedential sense, provide a constructive doctrinal starting point in adjudication under the open-textured clauses
of the Constitution. Paragraph three's properly-defined guidance
in equal protection cases provides vitality on the one hand, and
firmness and integrity on the other, to the equal protection
clause. 93 The prejudice which triggers exacting scrutiny, to be
properly defined, should result from a widespread hostility deeply
rooted in unjustified stereotypes and immutable characteristics
which define discrete and insular minority-ness. That is a firm
92. Though Owen Fiss describes the footnote as "[t]he great and modem
charter for ordering the relation between judges and other agencies of government," Fiss, The Supreme Cour4 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93

HARv. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979), others question its function as a doctrinal guide. See,
e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 656 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 90.
93. I say "vitality" because otherwise a general rational basis standard limits
application of the clause to infrequent cases; I say '"f-mness and integrity" because the enlargement of the scope of equal protection by an expansive definition

of suspect classes, the alternative, would subject the clause to evolving collective
value judgments of judges, in the manner of Lochner and Roe v. Wade. See supra

note 7.

[voL 20: 265, 1983]

State Alienage Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

and reliable standard-yet one that leaves the clause with vitality
beyond "race" and "national origin."

One further step for equal protection analysis may be appropriate. The mere finding of any rational basis for legislation affect-

ing other social minorities not fitting within the suggested
definition still provides the most precarious assurance that many
people marked as minorities in our society will get a fair shake.
Important state goals, not any rational objective, and a requirement that legislative classifications closely fit those important
goals constitutes a more appropriate standard against which to
measure questioned legislation in many cases.9 This standard
falls intentionally short of calling for expansive "suspect class"
categories but does call for a general test of greater vitality even
where suspect classes are not involved. 95 The essence of the interpretivist/non-interpretivist/process-oriented debate for constitutional cases generally is constitutional integrity and vitality. As
suggested, the application of some serious scrutiny where legislation affects minorities with the described characteristics does not
provide judges with an open invitation to impose positive value
choices as does a broad application of suspectness. Increasing ju94. The test proposed to assess the constitutional appropriateness of state
alienage classifications here is similar to the intermediate level of scrutiny applied
to gender- and perhaps illegitimacy-based classifications. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). The classification is invalidated unless it serves an important governmental interest and there is a substantial relationship between the basis for the classification and the important
governmental interest. It is also similar in effect to Justice Brennan's substantial
goal requirement in Plyler v. Doe. The Court determined that discrimination
could "hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of
the state." 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2398 (1982); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
517-22 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (more general application is advocated).
The important or substantial governmental interest test advocated should be characterized as a general test used whenever the classification applies to socially or
politically isolated minorities. Perhaps a rational basis test might be justified in
the remaining classes of cases, presumably some wholly economic-based classifications. Further, the test advocated would differ from that accepted by the Court
in that closely drawn classifications are required. This presents no unreasonable
burden upon state legislatures and contributes to the vitality of the equal protection clause as a meaningful principle. See Gunther, The Supreme Cour4 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HArrv. L. REV. 1 (1972); Nowak, Realizing the
Standards of Review under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral
and Permissible Classifications,62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974).
95. Professor Ely, for example, would not call for such a definitionally tight approach. Though he recognizes the usefulness of the factors described here, his approach is more functional in terms of symptoms, and powerlessness rather than
minority-ness seems more significant to him. See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 150-60.

dicial scrutiny in most cases adds vitality, but the definitional
standards for exacting scrutiny remain firm. Further, displacement of the rational basis test in cases affecting socially and politically isolated minorities not deemed suspect classes is
compatible with the generally understood meaning of the clause.
If applied consistently, it would solidly maintain the integrity of
the clause, the amendment, and ultimately the Constitution.
A

RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION
IN THE ALIENAGE CASES

Were we starting from a clean slate, formulating a recommendation for constitutional adjudication in this area would be a simpler matter. But the slate is not clean; nor is it constitutionally
healthy. And though the Court's own inconsistencies and freefloating standards are no justification for continuing to ignore
stare decisis, the needed infusion of constitutional integrity justifies a flexible application of stare decisis which, in any case,
would probably represent no graver encroachment than the next
decision of the Court itself.95 The recommendation here involves
96. Implicit in earlier criticism that the state alienage classification decisions
of the Court, beginning with Graham, misrepresent earlier decisions and are inconsistent and sequentially illogical is the failure of those opinions to properly adhere to the principle of stare decisis once the Court had settled upon a general
principle of constitutional law. Though not as important as fidelity to the constitutional text, the application of stare decisis once the Court arrives at a constitutional principle is essential to the maintenance of constitutional integrity.
Stare decisis in a constitutional sense is a touchy subject. The Constitution, not
judicial reasoning or incantation, is "the ultimate touchstone" and the importance
of constitutional meaning and the difficulty in rectifying questionable interpretations calls for flexibility in the application of stare decisis. See Graves v. New
York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also E.

LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 58-60 (1949); Reed, Stare Decisis and
ConstitutionalLaw 9 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 131 (1938); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 295 U.S. 393, 405-13 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Some in fact, have asserted that stare decisis has no place in constitutional law. See Armstrong, Mr.
Justice Douglas on Stare Decisis: A Condemnation of the Eighth Cardozo Lecture,
35 A.BA.J. 541, 541 n.3 (1949), in which the author quotes Justice Black when he
was a senator that "no doctrine of stare decisis applies to opinions in constitutional interpretation." Justice Douglas also showed little regard for it. Id. at 544.
Indeed, between 1960 and 1979 the Supreme Court explicitly overruled itself 47
times. See Maltz, Sane Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional
Law, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467, 494-96.
Nonetheless, the Court generally couches its decisions in terms of precedent
Such adherence is important simply because the Constitution is more than important; it is fundamental. If it is to be more than legislation, or judicial legislation, it
must be reliable, fairly certain, and certainly fair and uniform. Stare decisis applied to principles properly arrived at serves this heartening function. Neither
stare decisis nor a reasonable interpretivist mode is alone an infallible logical system. If the scientific method or another reassuringly objective method of the application of legal principles to varying factual circumstances were available, stare
decisis might be willingly discarded. Courts that are too stare decisis-bound do
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a quasi-interpretivist approach, something like John Ely's approach 97 but firmer, though not as literal as the interpretivist
mode of Raoul Berger 8 or perhaps Justice Rehnquist.9 9
The major question which the Court should seriously review is
whether aliens indeed should be deemed "suspect" for equal protection analysis purposes. Professor Ely regards ease of social intercourse and actual political power as very significant in his

representation-reinforcing functional approach to determining
whether a group is a "discrete and insular minority." He asserts
that alienage discrimination is "an easy case."1 00 He concludes
that an inability to vote coupled with time-honored traditional
American hostility toward "foreigners viewed through an overlay
not take changes in the general social or economic environment into consideration

sufficiently to permit the law to evolve in a way which is aligned with social, economic, and scientific evolution. But in a legal environment dominated by positive
law (here the Constitution) the frustratingly conservative nature of stare decisis,
so significant in a common law environment, is not a great weakness. In fact, stare
decisis in a constitutional or legislative sense affirmatively serves both constitutional and legislative fidelity, a rather important judicial function in a constitutional democracy.
97. I say "something like" because I would not agree that it is proper to draw
inferences from the general structure of the Constitution or from our federal democratic framework except to the extent that in making choices among reasonable
inferences drawn from the text, the compatibility of those inferences with that
structure and framework is essential; nor do I agree with an unguided application
of the CaroleneProductstest in an equal protection context. Further, Ely does not
seem to think much of "immutability" as necessary to the definition of a suspect
minority. See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 150-60. Though I do not view 'Immutability"
alone as a talisman, it is more than relevant. A firm though not unyielding definition of a "discrete and insular" minority is needed. Perhaps immutability as an
element of that definition should mean that the challenging minority is not reasonably able to change the characteristics upon which the legislative distinction rests
at the time the challenge is made. Assuming that other elements of the test are
met, this might then include race, nationality, cultural identity, gender, age, sexual
preference, physical or mental condition, and legitimacy. Whether it includes poverty status or alienage generally is more problematic. The latter is the subject of
this discussion.
98. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE Fouxmm m AMENDMENT (1977).

99. It is ironic, if not indeed disingenuous, that the later Court decisions, Foley, Ambach and Cabell, for which interpretivists were responsible, treated the
core principles of the earlier decisions with such liberality that they produced a
turnabout in the law in less than ten years.
One might understand non-interpretivists ignoring stare decisis. Results sup-

porting judicial value choices are more important objectives for them. But an interpretivist who ignores stare decisis is like a vegetarian who eats cheeseburgers
on the sly the latter is not much of a vegetarian, the former not much of an
interpretivist.
100. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 161.

of citizen legislatures resolves the matter of their suspectness."'ol
The case is not so easy though. His conclusion rests on facile
assumptions.
The ability to vote may seem to be relevant, but it is more
symptom than cause or description of minority-ness. No right to
vote exists because the right is denied certain groups; the right to
vote does not define a group, it simply confirms the group's inability to block the discriminatory legislation and may be symptomatic of some minorities. Powerlessness is in part a
characteristic of most minorities, but again it is an effect, a symptom. It does not tell us much about the characteristics of the
group which might lead to prejudicially motivated legislation.
Ely's further assertion of a time-honored traditional American
hostility toward foreigners sounds convincing, but it is not. He
cites Justice Blackmun's dissent in Ambach, in which the Justice
attributes much of the discriminating, legislation to the "frantic
and overreactive days of the first World War when attitudes of pa02
rochialism and fear of the foreigner were the order of the day."'
Although there has been hostility and prejudice against some
groups of immigrants (the Irish in the middle of the nineteenth
century,103 the Asians beginning in the last two decades of the
last century,10 4 and Jews and southern Europeans in the first two
decades of this century),105 the laws passed in those days, were
not hostile to all aliens.10 6 These laws were directed towards certain groups and nationalities. Though infamous in their immediate impact, they do not reflect widespread hostility, based upon
traditional and deep-rooted stereotypes and prejudice towards
aliens in general. Some significant hostility towards Asians and
southern and eastern Europeans is surely reflected, but not towards all aliens historically and continuing. While such hostility
is reproachful, and while it may serve as a basis for regarding
such immigrant nationalities as suspect classes, it does not
101. Id. at 161-62.
102. Id. at 255 n.87 (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (Blackmun,

J., dissenting)).
103. See, e.g., 0. HANDLin, BOSTON'S IMMGRANTS (1968).
104. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 594-96 (1889).
105. Restrictive immigration laws were passed in 1917 and 1924 chiefly in response to the south, central, and eastern European waves of immigration between
1890 and 1924. There were over four million Italian immigrants during this period
alone.
106. National origin quotas, initially based on percentages of that nationality in
the population in 1910 (then again in 1920) as well as a literacy requirement,
sharply curtailed immigration from southern and eastern Europe. See Act of Feb.
5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 877; Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, 6; Act of May 24,
1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 159-60.
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demonstrate widespread hostility towards aliens generally, particularly today.
Beyond "widespread hostility" it might be quite difficult to further demonstrate that the assumed hostility towards aliens in
general is deeply rooted in unwarranted stereotypes. There is no
evidence of widespread hostility towards northern Europeans, nor
does there seem to be towards central and southern Europeans
today. 107 Whenever there is present evidence of widespread hostility toward any group of aliens at all, it seems directed more towards a particularnationality, race, or cultural/ethnic group and
the circumstances of its arrival, rather than at aliens generally.
There is more to the problem of the criteria used in defining
alienage as a suspect class. Alienage is not an immutable quality,
at least not when facing discriminatory legislation which is limited to discriminating against those who do not intend to become
citizens.108 Many aliens, especially those eligible to enter and reside in the United States, can change their status in three to five
years by naturalization.10 9 Legislation which is qualified by an
"intention to become a citizen" exception indeed discriminates
against these "mutable" aliens only to the extent they are unwilling to change. To the extent that the legislation addresses all
aliens whether they intend to change or not, during the period
they are unable to become citizens they are an "immutable"
group. If neither aliens generally nor aliens ineligible for citizenship are members of the group addressed by the legislation, then
the legislation addresses a group that can change. In this latter
case, then, it seems doctrinally and methodologically appropriate
107. Justice Blackmun's apparent contention that the challenged alienage laws
were passed in a frantic, emotion-laden environment, though perhaps alluring, especially in 1971, seems misplaced. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Further, continuing aversion to the minority at the time of

the challenge rather than merely at time of passage is the relevant factor in considering whether a group is a "discrete and insular minority." The law is being
acquiesced in and utilized by the legislature. Therefore, whether it is being presently used to discriminate against a presently "suspect" group seems the more ap-

propriate inquiry.
108. If the animating hostility towards aliens is deemed to be widespread and
deeply rooted in stereotypes, then it could be argued that state legislation discriminating on the basis of alienage which is not limited to aliens who do not intend to
become citizens is directed towards a "suspect" class. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. In view of the difficulty of satisfying the widespread hostility
and stereotype criteria, however, this point should not be reached by the adjudi-

cating court.
109. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1430(a) (1976).

for courts to sustain discriminatory legislation upon a lower level
of justification than "strict scrutiny."
If we accept standard equal protection analysis, that is, the rational basis test, such legislation may discriminate rather
freely.n0 But, the rational basis test seems particularly inappropriate where legislation affects a classification or group which is
politically and socially isolated as a result of the identifying characteristics of the group which are also the subject of the discrimination. Cubans or Mexicans residing in the United States, for
example, may arguably be "suspect" groups qua Cubans or Mexicans, but merely politically and socially isolated as part of the
larger group-aliens. If legislatures can, in effect, discriminate
against a group which is not suspect (aliens), and reach subgroups within the non-suspect group (Cubans or Haitians), then
the high scrutiny of the equal protection afforded particular national minorities will be easily evaded by couching the discrimination in terms of "alienage." A rational basis requirement is
simply no protection because any "legitimate" governmental objective overcomes it.
Where a politically and socially isolated group such as aliens
generally is affected, however, a requirement that the governmental objective be important in comparison to the effect of the discrimination, and that the legislative classification be drawn with
precision seems to be a fair and sound test."' It is fair because it
provides vitality to the equal protection clause with respect to legislative discrimination against social minorities not meeting the
firm "suspect class" criteria. Though it is recognized that no
purely verbal definition provides a talisman to infallibility, the
strict scrutiny/compelling state interest test must be limited to
legislation affecting those groups who, within the suggested
Carolene Products-guideddefinition, share characteristics of race,
nationality, religious and cultural identification if the prime role
of the clause is to remain meaningful. The second-line test suggested here, a balancing approach, is far from talismanic. It is
sound, though, in that it permits the Court to make a searching
inquiry, yet does not leave a legislature with an insurmountable
1 12
compelling state interest hurdle.
110. The Court's difficulty applying a traditional rational basis test was notable
in Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394 (1982). Because of the lack of vitality in the

traditional test the Court was forced to invent a hybrid for present purposes, adding that rational basis under the circumstances of that case meant that the legislation must serve a "substantial goal." See supra notes 10, 80 & 94 and
accompanying text.
111. See supra note 94.
112. The compelling state interest test need not be as unleapable a hurdle as
the practice of the court suggests. As indicated earlier, citizenship requirements
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From a quasi-interpretivist viewpoint, the problem with a
broader "suspect" class definition is that it leaves the Court with
a wide range of value choices. Courts with certain value orientations will want to protect aliens, women, youth, homosexuals, or
radicals. Courts with other orientations may want to protect caucasians, professionals, capitalists and perhaps even opticians.
Suspectness applied ipse dixit as did the Supreme Court in Graham" 3 encourages substantive value choices, and moves the primary constitutional role from the Constitution to the present
majority on the Court. The integrity of this fundamental law thus
becomes too precariously dependent upon the prudence of successive majorities.
Applying the suggested "important state interest" balancing approach to Cabell, it may be that the governmental objective underlying the requirement that law enforcement peace officers who
actually make public order, arrest, and detention decisions at
least intend to become citizens is an important objective. The objective that all aliens be excluded from these positions, however,
may not be so important. So, to the extent that the Cabell legislation deprives aliens intending to become citizens from eligibility
for law enforcement positions, it should not survive equal protection clause analysis.
Further, even if the Court were to find that citizenship for some
peace officers was an important governmental objective, the legislation may arguably not serve an important objective as applied
to the deputy probation officers in Cabell because deputy probation officers primarily supervise, maintain records and make recommendations to the court. The decision-making and law
enforcement functions of probation officers seem to be rarely exercised, and to the extent citizenship-imposed loyalty may be a
desirable quality, it is not a quality high on the 4list of important
ones for the effectiveness of a probation officer."
Under the suggested equal protection clause analysis, therefore,
California can probably legitimately discriminate against aliens in
for police are at least arguably compelling. However, the test is seen as virtually
unleapable, and as long as it is, its application must be limited.

113. The Court in Graham simply asserted that "[alliens as a class are a prime
example of a 'discrete and insular' minority, for whom.., heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 403 U.S. at 372 (citation omitted).
114. To this extent, the statute as a whole is not precise due to its overinclusiveness. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. at 740-41.

some areas where the state interest served is important and the
legislation is precisely drawn. It cannot do so with respect to deputy probation officers, however, without demonstrating a more
significant connection between citizenship and the actual role of
the probation officer. The state must show why the quality "citizenship" is more important in relation to other qualities not legislatively excepted.
Though this solution arguably requires a departure from precedent, the method of adjudication and the constitutional interpretation derived is probably in harmony with all of the recent
results except for Ambach and Cabell; and Ambach and Cabell
can be viewed as uncalled-for departures from precedent since all
prior decisions upholding state classifications concerned classifications which did serve important state interests and were narrowly confined to those interests. Ambach and Cabell were
results of ignoring precedent and should themselves perhaps be
viewed as aberrations not to be extended rather than as products
of well-settled principles. In any case, where constitutional law is
concerned, the primacy of faithfully derived constitutional meaning over precedent questionably arrived at is clear.
CONCLUSION

This recommendation applies a firm quasi-interpretivist method
of adjudication to the equal protection clause, yet leaves it with
vitality. Though a platonic guardian of morality would prefer to
apply the "suspect" category to aliens as opposed to the present
suspect class/reasonable basis hybrid, neither is constitutionally
appropriate and both lead to constitutional interpretations ridden
with Court-imposed value choices.
The remnants of "reasonable basis" analysis in equal protection
cases should be sparse, perhaps limited to purely economic classifications, because reasonable basis seems to constitute virtually
any basis and therefore provides no protection.
Finally, can even a literalist argue with the notion that equal
protection of the laws means at least that socially and politically
isolated groups should be protected from abusive legislation directed at the group when that legislation is not even justified by
an important objective?" 5 Isn't this notion constitutionally pru115. A literalist/interpretivist must argue for limiting strict scrutiny to race and
national origin classifications because historically these categories were all that
the framers of the amendment contemplated. But the motives and intent of the
framers of the amendment are impossible to ascertain with any degree of certainty, and certainty should be important to literalist/interpretivists. Further, if
the clause were to be so limited, couldn't the framers have so provided? We can
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dent? And, even though in a democracy the majority should well
be able to send itself to the devil, without a good reason should it
be able to send others without going along?

only assume that no such specific limitation could have been agreed upon or, if it
could have, they decided against using it.
Also, by its terms, the clause states that no state may "deny any person within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws" (emphasis supplied). These are farreaching words. To be strictly literal the Court would, upon challenge, be compelled to strike virtually any legislation creating a classification. The logic of the
literalist/interpretivist view taken to this extreme would emasculate the usefulness of state legislatures and contradict the goal of prudence to which the literalist/interpretivist type of constitutional adjudication aspires. A literalist/
interpretivist approach to the open-textured clauses cannot produce defensible
constitutional meaning.

